In Illinois, a buyer who purchases a brand-new house from the builder gets a warranty that the contract never has to mention. The Illinois Supreme Court recognized it in 1979 in Petersen v. Hubschman Construction Co., 76 Ill. 2d 31, and described it as an implied covenant that the house the builder contracts to build and convey is reasonably suitable for its intended use.
That warranty is the legal floor under every new build, and a builder can ask you to sign it away. If you are looking at new construction homes in Rockford, the paper that matters is not the brochure. It is the part of the purchase contract that either leaves this warranty alone or replaces it with something else. Gambino Realtors has been in business in Rockford since 1923, and this guide sticks to what the Illinois courts and statutes say. It is not legal advice, so have an Illinois real estate attorney read any contract before you sign.
Before Petersen, a buyer who found a hidden defect after closing had very little to stand on. The opinion names the two old rules that caused that. Caveat emptor meant the buyer took the property at his own risk. Merger meant every agreement between buyer and seller was said to merge into the deed, so a promise about quality could disappear at closing. The court called the new warranty a judicial innovation, created to avoid the harshness of both rules and to give some relief to buyers of new homes who later discover latent defects in the structure.
The court gave its reasons in plain terms. Many new houses, it wrote, are "in a sense, now mass produced." In many instances the buyer purchases from a model home or from predrawn plans. The construction methods leave the buyer little or no opportunity to inspect. The buyer is making a major investment, in many instances the largest single investment of a life, is usually not knowledgeable in construction practices, and has to rely on the integrity and the skill of the builder. From that the court drew its rule: the buyer has a right to expect a house that is reasonably fit for use as a residence.
Notice the word latent. The warranty extends only to latent defects, meaning problems that are hidden when the buyer signs and closes. Some courts had limited the warranty to houses that were unfinished at signing, on the theory that a buyer of a finished house can inspect it first. The Illinois Supreme Court said it did not agree with that reasoning and held that the buyer may recover for latent defects whether the house is complete or incomplete when the contract is signed. The court did not treat a buyer's chance to inspect a finished house as a substitute for the warranty.
The warranty also does not wait for the deed. It arises when the buyer and the builder sign the sales agreement, it exists as an independent undertaking alongside the promise to convey, and it survives delivery of the deed. That is how it escapes the merger rule. The Supreme Court has since described it as a creature of contract, not tort, which matters for the question of who can be sued. That comes up in the third section.
Does a house need to be unlivable before the warranty applies? No. The builder in Petersen argued exactly that. The court wrote that the mere fact that a house is capable of being inhabited does not satisfy the implied warranty, and it called the word "habitability" perhaps unfortunate for the same reason. The standard the court settled on is a house reasonably suited for its intended use. Look at what the buyers in that case actually complained about. The trial court found a basement floor pitched in the wrong direction, away from the drain. It found improperly installed siding, a defective and ill-fitting bay window, a seriously defective front door and door frame, and deterioration and nail-popping in the drywall. Nobody disputed that the house was habitable, in the sense that the buyers could live in it and it was not dangerously unsafe. The buyers still won. They refused to close, the builder tried to keep their earnest money, the trial court found the builder had not substantially performed, and the Supreme Court affirmed.
Two limits are worth knowing, because the court itself stated them. In Petersen the court did not decide what the appropriate remedy would be if the defects were not found until after the deed was delivered. It also did not decide whether the warranty exists when a builder builds a house for someone else on that buyer's own land. Where the courts have not spoken, an attorney is the person to ask.
What counts as a new house is a fact question. In Park v. Sohn, which the Supreme Court discussed in a later opinion, the builders had lived in the house for a time before selling it. The court said whether a house is new for warranty purposes is a question of fact decided case by case, and that holding the warranty off because the builders had occupied the house would hand builders a simple artifice for avoiding it. The same case also held that the builder did not have to be a full-time professional. He had built one house before that one and six more afterward.
The same opinion that created the warranty said it can be given up. A knowing disclaimer is not against the public policy of the state. The court attached conditions that are hard on the builder. The disclaimer must be strictly construed against the builder. A boilerplate clause, however worded, is ineffective. The builder has to show a conspicuous provision that fully discloses the consequences of including it, and also that it was in fact the agreement the parties reached. In the court's own words, quoting a Missouri decision, a knowing waiver of this protection will not be readily implied.
In 2001 the Illinois Supreme Court sharpened that rule in a condominium case against the developer, Wilmette Partners, 198 Ill. 2d 132. The developer had sold units in a 36-unit condominium building, and 29 of the 36 purchase contracts carried a disclaimer in section 10. It excluded all other warranties, express or implied, including by way of illustration the warranties of fitness for a particular purpose and merchantability. The lower courts enforced the disclaimer. The Supreme Court reversed, because the clause never referred to the implied warranty of habitability by name. The court held that a disclaimer that does not reference the implied warranty of habitability by name is not a valid disclaimer of that warranty.
That rule is useful to a buyer because it is a test you can apply with a pen. Find the section of the contract that disclaims warranties. Read it for the words "implied warranty of habitability." If those words are missing, the clause did not work as a waiver under Wilmette, even if the clause is printed prominently. The court also noted what a clear disclaimer looks like. The model published by the Chicago Bar Association, and the one in a case called Breckenridge v. Cambridge Homes, identify the implied warranty of habitability, set out the consequences of waiving it, and establish that the disclaimer was the parties' agreement. The court declined to adopt any model as law.
A real, valid waiver is not a trick. It is a trade, and the Supreme Court has said so. In Fattah v. Bim, 2016 IL 119365, the court explained that a builder offers a bargained-for waiver in order to obtain a date certain on which its exposure to financial risk on the house will end. That certainty has a cost. The builder must offer the buyer either a reduction in price or some other consideration, such as an express warranty, in exchange.
The facts in Fattah show how the trade plays out. A builder began a house in Glenview in 2005 and sold it in 2007. Attached to that contract was a "Waiver and Disclaimer of Implied Warranty of Habitability" in which the buyer knowingly, voluntarily, fully and forever waived the warranty in exchange for an express warranty from the builder. The filings indicate the express warranty ran for one year, and it is undisputed that the builder honored it. In 2010 the first buyer sold the house to a second buyer, who took it "as is" and closed in November of that year. In February 2011 a retaining wall around the patio gave way and part of the patio collapsed. The trial court found latent defects in the construction. The second buyer still lost, because the Supreme Court held that the implied warranty cannot be extended to a second purchaser when a valid, bargained-for waiver exists between the builder and the first purchaser.
The two cases pull in opposite directions, and that is the point. A waiver that is missing the warranty's name fails, as in Wilmette. A waiver that names it, explains the consequences and was actually bargained for holds, and it holds against the next buyer too, as in Fattah. Ask what you are getting in return for it. In Fattah the exchange was an express warranty with a stated term. The implied warranty has no such text, because the court supplied it. Once the implied warranty is waived, the express warranty is what the sales contract leaves you, so read it like the contract it is.
Put in the form of questions to take to the builder, in writing, before you sign:
Does this contract disclaim or waive the implied warranty of habitability, and where? Does the waiver name that warranty, so it passes the Wilmette test? What express warranty replaces it, for how long, and for which parts of the house? Is the entity that signs the contract the same entity that will honor the warranty? And does the contract give you any price reduction or other consideration for the waiver? None of those questions is hostile. Each one maps to a rule the Supreme Court has written down.
The warranty runs from the builder-vendor, the party that sold you the house. It does not run from every tradesperson who touched it. In Sienna Court Condominium Association v. Champion Aluminum Corp., 2018 IL 122022, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the purchaser of a newly constructed home may not pursue an implied warranty of habitability claim against a subcontractor with whom the purchaser has no contractual relationship. Six justices joined the opinion and one dissented. The reasoning followed from Petersen. Because the warranty arises from the contract of sale, the court said, it is a creature of contract, not tort. The court overruled an earlier appellate decision, Minton v. Richards Group of Chicago.
The facts in Sienna are the reason that matters. The case involved a 111-unit condominium property in Evanston. The developer and the general contractor were both declared bankrupt. Each had two liability insurance policies, and the association recovered part of its loss from a warranty escrow fund that the developer had been required to set up under a City of Evanston ordinance. The unit owners still wanted to sue the subcontractors directly, and the court said they could not. It added that bankruptcy is a possibility faced by every civil litigant, and that the owners had possessed a potential cause of action against the developer, assuming they had not waived the warranty. The practical lesson is blunt. The company whose name is on your contract is the company the warranty runs against, so find out exactly which entity that is before you sign.
A resale does not automatically end the warranty. In Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 92 Ill. 2d 171, a builder finished a house in early 1976 and the plaintiff bought it from the original owners in April 1977. Soon afterward he found that a chimney and an adjoining brick wall were pulling away from the house. The court extended the implied warranty to him and wrote that privity of contract is not required. The extension was limited to latent defects that manifest themselves within a reasonable time after the purchase, and the court reasoned that a builder should not expect the warranty to be limited by the number of days the original owner holds the property. Fattah later explained the principle underneath. A second buyer is merely stepping into the shoes of the first, which gives the second buyer the first buyer's rights and also the first buyer's waiver.
How long does anyone have to bring a claim? The warranty cases do not give a number of days. Illinois has a construction statute, 735 ILCS 5/13-214, that sets limits for actions based on tort, contract or otherwise against any person for an act or omission in the design, planning, supervision, observation or management of construction, or in the construction of an improvement to real property. Under subsection (a), such an action must be commenced within 4 years from the time the person bringing it knew or should reasonably have known of the act or omission. Under subsection (b), no such action may be brought after 10 years have elapsed from the time of the act or omission. A person who discovers it before those 10 years run out still has no less than 4 years. Subsection (d) says the 10-year limit does not bar an action against a defendant who expressly warranted the improvement for a longer period, and subsection (e) says the limits do not apply to causes of action arising out of fraudulent misrepresentation or fraudulent concealment. Whether a given warranty claim falls under that statute is a legal question, so treat these numbers as the statute's text and not as advice about your own deadline.
One more document you may expect is not there. The disclosure report used in resales is covered in Illinois Seller Disclosure Report in Rockford. The Residential Real Property Disclosure Act applies to transfers of residential real property except as Section 15 provides. Section 15(9) exempts transfers of newly constructed residential real property that has never been occupied, and it states that the exemption does not include rehabilitation of existing residential property. So on a never-occupied new house the builder does not owe you that report. The implied warranty and the sales contract are what you have in its place, which is another reason to read the warranty section closely.
A new build raises other questions that this guide does not cover. How the city handles permits and the certificate of occupancy is in Rockford New Construction: Permits, Inspections, CO, and how the county taxes a new house in its first years is in New Construction Property Taxes in Winnebago County.
You have a warranty before you ask for one. The Illinois Supreme Court has held since 1979 that a builder who sells you a new house impliedly promises it is reasonably suited for its intended use, and that promise reaches latent defects even if the house is livable. The same court has said a builder can trade that promise away, but only through a conspicuous clause that names the implied warranty of habitability, spells out what you are giving up, and reflects what you and the builder actually agreed.
So the decision in front of you is narrow and concrete. If the contract leaves the implied warranty alone, you keep it. If the contract waives it, check for the warranty's name and look at the express warranty that replaces it, because that is now your coverage and it can only be as good as the entity that signed it. The warranty runs against the builder you contracted with, not against the subcontractors, and a later buyer inherits whatever you were given, waiver included. Before you commit to new construction homes in Rockford, put those questions to the builder in writing and have an attorney read the answer.
Here are short answers to the questions the warranty section raises.
Yes. In Petersen v. Hubschman Construction Co. (1979), the Illinois Supreme Court held that a sale of a new house by a builder-vendor carries an implied warranty that the house is reasonably suited for its intended use. It arises when the sales agreement is signed and survives delivery of the deed. It covers latent defects, meaning hidden ones, and it applies whether the house was finished or unfinished when you signed. A builder can waive it only through a clause that meets the court's conditions.
No. The builder in Petersen made exactly that argument and lost. The court wrote that the mere fact that a house is capable of being inhabited does not satisfy the implied warranty. The standard is a house reasonably suited for its intended use. In that case the buyers complained of a basement floor pitched away from the drain, bad siding, a defective bay window and door, and drywall deterioration, and nobody disputed that the house could be lived in.
A builder can ask, and a valid waiver is allowed. The Illinois Supreme Court requires a conspicuous provision that fully discloses the consequences and reflects the agreement the parties actually reached, strictly construed against the builder. Under Wilmette Partners (2001), a disclaimer that does not refer to the implied warranty of habitability by name is not a valid disclaimer. In Fattah v. Bim (2016), the court noted that the builder must give some consideration in exchange, such as a price reduction or an express warranty.
Not under the implied warranty of habitability. In Sienna Court Condominium Association v. Champion Aluminum Corp. (2018), the Illinois Supreme Court held that the purchaser of a newly constructed home may not bring that claim against a subcontractor with whom the purchaser has no contractual relationship, because the warranty is a creature of contract. The claim runs against the builder-vendor you contracted with. Confirm which legal entity signs your contract, because that entity is the one the warranty runs against.
Possibly. In Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf (1982), the Illinois Supreme Court extended the warranty to a second buyer for latent defects that manifest within a reasonable time after the purchase. In Fattah v. Bim (2016), the court held that the warranty may not be extended to a second purchaser when the first purchaser executed a valid, bargained-for waiver. So the first buyer's waiver travels with the house. Ask whether the first buyer waived the warranty, and have an attorney check.
The statute for construction claims, 735 ILCS 5/13-214, says an action must be commenced within 4 years from when you knew or should reasonably have known of the act or omission. No action may be brought after 10 years from the act or omission, but a person who discovers it before then has no less than 4 years. A longer express warranty can extend the period, and fraud is not covered by the limits. Whether the statute governs your claim is a question for an attorney.
Not if the house has never been occupied. The Illinois Residential Real Property Disclosure Act, at 765 ILCS 77/15(9), exempts transfers of newly constructed residential real property that has never been occupied. The exemption does not include rehabilitation of existing residential property.